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_____________________ 
 
OPINION* 
_____________________ 
 
McKEE, Circuit Judge. 
 Calvin Carlyle Rivers petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals 
decision finding him ineligible for Cancelation of Removal based on a conviction for 
solicitation to commit possession of marijuana for sale under Arizona law.  For the 
reasons that follow, we will grant Rivers’ petition for review, vacate the order of removal 
and remand to the Board for further proceedings.1  
 
I. 
Rivers argues that solicitation to commit possession of marijuana for sale is not an 
aggravated felony under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43).2  
 
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
1 We exercise jurisdiction over a final order of removal pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 
1252(a)(1). When an order of removal is based on an aggravated felony conviction, we 
review only “constitutional claims or questions of law raised upon [the] petition for 
review.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(C)-(D); Rachak v. Att’y Gen., 734 F.3d 214, 216 (3d Cir. 
2013). 
 
2 Pet. Br. at 6.  
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We review whether a state criminal conviction constitutes a federal aggravated felony de 
novo.3  
 Under Arizona law, a person commits solicitation if “with the intent to promote or 
facilitate the commission of a felony or misdemeanor, such person commands, 
encourages, requests or solicits another person to engage in specific conduct” that would 
constitute the underlying crime.4 Specifically, Rivers pled guilty to soliciting another 
person to possess marijuana for sale. The Board found that Rivers’ solicitation offense 
was an illicit trafficking offense under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(B).   
The Board relied upon the “illicit trafficking” approach to hold that solicitation to 
commit possession of marijuana for sale is an aggravated felony.5 Under the illicit 
trafficking approach, a state drug conviction is an aggravated felony if it is a felony under 
state law6 and contains an element of trafficking.7  
 
3 Evanson v. Att’y Gen., 550 F.3d 284, 288 (3d Cir. 2008). 
4 Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-1002(A). 
5 See Evanson, 550 F.3d at 288-89 (explaining that we use the “hypothetical federal 
felony” approach or the “illicit trafficking” approach to determine whether a state drug 
offense constitutes an aggravated felony under federal law). The Court of Appeals for the 
Ninth Circuit has held that solicitation to possess marijuana for sale is not an aggravated 
felony under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(B). See Leyva-Licea v. INS, 187 F.3d 1147, 1150 
(9th Cir. 1999).  Thereafter, in United States v. Ibarra-Luna, 628 F.3d 712, 716 (5th Cir. 
2010), the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reached the same conclusion.   
 We agree that Rivers’ solicitation offense is not an aggravated felony under the 
hypothetical federal felony approach, as solicitation is not punishable as a felony under 
the Controlled Substances Act. See Jeune v. Att’y Gen., 476 F.3d 199, 201 (3d Cir. 2007).  
This is no doubt why the Board only addressed the illicit trafficking approach in 
determining if a state drug offense is an aggravated felony under federal law.  
6 Rivers’ solicitation conviction is a class four felony under Arizona law. See Ariz. Rev. 
Stat. §§ 13-1002, 13-3401, 13-3405, 13-3418, 13-701, 13-702, and 13-801. 
7 Gerbier v. Holmes, 280 F.3d 297, 313 (3d Cir. 2002). 
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Aiding and abetting the possession of cocaine does not include a transaction in 
commerce between the parties and is therefore not a trafficking offense.8 The Board also 
applies a “commercial transaction test” to determine if a statute includes an element of 
trafficking, defining a “commercial transaction” as the “passing of goods from one 
person to another for money or other consideration.”9 
 Under none of these descriptions of illicit trafficking does Rivers’ conviction for 
solicitation include an element of trafficking. Solicitation under Arizona law is complete 
as soon as encouragement has occurred, whether or not the person solicited agrees to any 
criminal plan or even believes the solicitor is serious.10 Because Rivers’ conviction could 
be complete at the moment of encouragement, without any subsequent transaction, it did 
not include an element of trafficking.  
 Contrary to the Government’s suggestion,11 we cannot look to the elements of the 
underlying criminal behavior that Rivers solicited in order to find the commercial 
element.12 Arizona caselaw makes clear that solicitation is “a completely separate crime 
from the offense solicited” and “cannot be equated with the underlying offense.”13  
 
8 Lopez v. Gonzales, 549 U.S. 47, 54 (2006). 
9 Matter of L-G-H, 26 I&N Dec. 365, 371 n.9 (B.I.A. 2014). 
10 State v. Miller, 316 P.3d 1219, 1230 (Ariz. 2013) (“But solicitation only requires action 
and intent by the solicitor. It does not require that the solicited persons believe the 
solicitor is serious.”); State v. Flores, 188 P.3d 706, 709 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2008) 
(“Solicitation is a crime separate from the crime solicited, and, unlike conspiracy, the 
crime of solicitation is complete when the solicitor, acting with the requisite intent, 
makes the request. It requires no agreement or action by the person solicited.”).  
11 Gov’t Br. at 26-7.  
12 See Moncrieffe v. Holder, 569 U.S. 184, 191 (2013). 
13 State v. Ysea, 956 P.2d 499, 503 (Ariz. 1998); State v. Tellez, 799 P.2d 1, 4 (Ariz. Ct. 
App. 1989). See also State v. Woods, 815 P.2d 912, 913 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1991) (“The 
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 The aggravated felony statute is reserved for “the most serious criminal 
offenses,”14 and we therefore decline to extend the definition to include the mere 
solicitation of another person to commit an enumerated offense. Because Rivers’ 
conviction for soliciting the possession of marijuana for sale is not punishable as a felony 
under the Controlled Substances Act and does not include an element of commercial 
dealing, it is not an aggravated felony under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(B).  
IV. 
 For the reasons above, we grant Rivers’ petition for review, vacate the order of 
removal, and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.  
 
 
crime of solicitation is not ‘by its very nature always a constituent part’ of the crime of 
sale of a narcotic drug because the mental and physical elements of solicitation are not 
necessarily elements of the underlying offense.”).  
14 H.R. Rep. No. 109-135(I), at 69 (2005).  
